The paper seeks to interpret the liberal paradox in a framework where individual rights are represented as game forms. Several close counterparts, in this framework, of Sen's theorem are considered, and their intuitive significance is discussed.
Introduction
paradox of the Paretian liberal,* 1 which first formally demon strated the tension between individual rights and welfaristic values, consti tutes one of the central results in social choice theory and has had far reaching influence on the development of the subject. However, a number of writers2 have argued that Sen's formal formulation of individual rights does not cor respond to our intuition about rights, and that a more adequate formulation of rights can be given in terms of game forms that specify the permissible strategies of each individual in the society and also an outcome for each pos sible configuration of permissible individual strategies. In this paper, I shall not discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of Sen's formulation of rights and the alternative formulation in terms of game forms, that Sen's critics have suggested. Instead, I shall focus on a different problem. Is it possible to have, in the game form approach to individual rights, an exact counterpart of Sen's theorem(s) on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal? The main purpose of this paper is to explore this issue.
The plan of the paper is as follows. I lay down the notation and basic def initions in Section 2. In Section 3, I give a brief statement of Sen's paradox. In Section 4.1, I summarize the main ideas underlying the game form formu lation of individual rights. The rest of Section 4 is concerned with alternative translations of Sen's result in terms of the game form approach. I consider different versions of the paradox when individual rights are represented by game forms. Some of these versions turn out to be to be more interesting than the others. In Section 5 ,1 summarize the main conclusions of the paper.
The Notation and Basic Concepts
Let X be the universal set of social alternatives and let Z be the set of all non-empty subsets of X. SR will denote the set of all orderings over X.3 The elements of 5ft will be denoted by R,R' etc. and will be interpreted as weak preference relations ('at least as good as') over X. For all x,y € X and all R E 5ft, xPy iff [xRy and not yRx]. Thus, intuitively, P is the strict preference relation ('better than') corresponding to R.
Let N = {1,... , n} denote the society. A social decision rule (SDR) is a function D : Z x -> Z such that, for all A E Z and all (i?i,... ,f?n) E 5fn, D(A\ i? i,... ,i?n) C A. D(A;Ri,... ,i?n) is to be interpreted as the set of socially chosen alternatives when A is the feasible set of social alternatives and (i?i,. .. , Rn) is the profile of preference orderings of the individuals in the society.
A game form is an (n + 2)-tuple < A; S i,... , Sn]g >, where: (1) A E Z is the set of possible outcomes; (2) for every i E N, Si is the set of strategies of individual z; and (3) g : Yl Si A is the outcome function which, for and s*j = s'-. For all i e N , the elements of Yl Sj will be denoted by 3 An ordering over A is a binary relation R that satisfies: (i) reflexivity: for all x E X,xRx\ (ii) connectedness: for all distinct x,y E X,xRy or yRx\ and (iii) transitivity: for all distinct x,y>z E X, [xRy and yRz] implies [xRz).
4 Strictly speaking, in defining a game, one should take the restrictions of Äi,... ,Rn to the set of possible outcomes figuring in the game, rather than the orderings R\ ,., Rn which are defined over the universal set of alternatives, X. However, for the sake of economy in notation, I depart from the usual formal practice.
s-i = (si,..., Si-i, si+i,...,sn) , s'_i = ( s i,...,s i _ 1,sj+1,...,s^) and so on. For all s-i G Yl Sj and G 5», (s_i, s^) will denote s* such that Sj = Sj for all j e N -{z}, and s* == sj.
The Liberal Paradox
The first formulation (see Sen 1970 a; b) of the liberal paradox was in a framework where social preference, rather than social choice, was the primitive notion. Later, it was restated in terms of social choice (see, for example , Sen 1976; 1983) . For our purpose, the social choice formulation will be most convenient. Accordingly, I consider the paradox in the framework of social decision rules which are based on the primitive notion of social choice as distinct from social preference. I first define several well known properites of a GDR. Let D be a GDR. D satisfies: These properites are very familiar in the literature on social choice theory and hardly need much explanation. It may, however, be worth noting the following points. First, Sen intended (3.1) and (3.2) to capture only some necessary conditions for an individual i to have a right, especially a right involving his autonomy over his private life (recall that the alternatives x and y, referred to in (3.1) and (3.2), were interpreted by Sen as social alternatives which were indentical in all respects except for some feature, say, Vs religion, which related to the private life of i). Secondly, while GL assumes that (3.1) should hold for every i in iV, Sen only required that (3.1) should hold for every i in some subset of iV, containing at least two members. One can also weaken BL along similar lines. However, such weakening of GL and BL is not crucial for my purpose, and I shall use conditions GL and BL, though the weaker versions of these conditions were used by Sen in proving the liberal paradox. Lastly, it may be noted that BL and REJ, together, imply GL, though the converse is not necessarily true. Similarly, BBC and REJ, together, imply, but are not implied, by GPC.
The following two propositions represent two different versions of Sen's liberal paradox in the framework of a social decision rule. 
Interpretation of the Liberal Paradox
In this section, I seek to interpret Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 in a framework where individual rights are represented by game forms.
Rights as Game Forms
As noted in the introduction, a number of writers have suggested formulations of rights that radically differ from Sen's formulation. While the alternative approaches suggested by these writers are similar in many ways, there are also significant differences.5 In this paper, I shall focus on one of these formulations of individual rights, namely, the formulation in terms of (normal) game forms; I shall call it the game form approach to individual rights. A game form representation of a rights-structure is simply a specification of a (normal) game form Ga = < A; S\a, • • •, SnA\9A > for every A £ Z, where, for every i £ IV, Si a is interpreted as the set of all strategies permissi ble for individual i, given that A is the set of all feasible social alternatives. The game form < A; Si a, • • •, SnA',9A > is intended to capture the powers, freedoms, immunities and claims conferred on the individuals by the rights structure,6 when A is the set of all feasible social alternatives. A detailed discussion of the game from formulation of individual rights and how it differs from Sen's formulation is beyond the scope of this paper,7 but, it is important to note the following difference between the two approaches. Sen's conception of an individual's right, as incorporated in GL and BL, involves restrictions on social choice which are contingent on the nature of individual preferences over certain pairs of social alternatives. In contrast, the game form formu lation of individual rights does not refer at all to individual preferences over social alternatives; nor does it refer to the actual outcome of any game. The game form approach claims that, given a feasible set, A, of social alternatives, the substantive content of the rights that the individuals enjoy is entirely cap tured by the sets of permissible strategies of the individuals and the outcome function that specifies the outcome for each possible n-tuple of permissible strategies.
In te rp re ta tio n of an SDR in th e G am e Form approach
To interpret Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 in the game form approach, we first need to interpret the notion of an SDR in terms of game forms and games. Suppose the rights-structure, in the sense in which the game form approach visualizes it, is given by a function G that specifies a game form Ga for every A E Z. Throughout the rest of this paper, G will denote the rights-structure in this sense. Given G, for every A E Z and every (i?i,... given by 9a{J{Ga\ Ri , ---,R n)) (recall that qa is the outcome finction in the game form Ga specified by G for A). We can now interpret an SDR D as a function which, for every A E Z, and every (i?i,... , i?n) E 5ftn, specifies the (singleton) set {9a(J(Ga\Ru ... ,iJn))} as the set of socially chosen alterna tives. Thus, under our interpretation of the SDR, the socially chosen outcome for a given A € Z and a given (i?i, . . . , Rn)e5Rn is just the outcome of the game (Ga',Ri , • • • ,^n ) as determined by whatever strategies the individuals may choose in the game and the outcome function qa-
Re-interpretation of Proposition 3.1
First, I consider Proposition 3.1 and the two conditions, GPC and GL, which figure in it. Given the interpretation of an SDR in the game form framework, GL and GPC can be reformulated in an obvious fashion (I call these versions of GL and GPC, GL' and GPC1, respectively): 
GV and GPC1 constitute restrictions on the game forms specified by the rights structure G, and the function J, taken together.
Proposition 4.1 below constitutes the counterpart of Proposition 3.1 in the game form approach to rights.
Proposition J^.l: There do not exist rights-structure G and function J such that GL1 and GPC* are both satisfied. Given the game form approach to individual rights, GL' cannot be inter preted as a condition that follows directly from the existence of rights (more specifically, from the existence of rights to autonomy in private affairs) for each individual. For, unlike Sen who interpreted (3.1) as a necessary condi tion for an individual i to have a right, the game from approach does not recognise any conceptual link between: (i) an individual's having a right; and (ii) that individual's preferences over different soical alternatives and the ac tual social choice of an alternative. It is only when we come to the issue of the exercise of rights that the game form approach recognises the relevance of individual preferences over social alternatives: given the powers, freedoms, claims and immunities which are guaranteed by the rights structure G, the individuals' choices of strategies and, hence, the actual social outcome, will depend on individual preferences over the social alternatives. In view of this, it seems natural to regard GL1 as a 'hybrid' condition that follows from: (i) the requirement that every individual should have rights as conceived in the game form framework; and (ii) certain empirical assumptions about how people behave when they have the powers, freedoms etc. guaranteed by the rights-structure G. Thus, the following three intuitive statements, together, may be regarded as the conceptual basis of GV\ Every individual should have the right to autonomy in his private life. ... (4.1) For alH £ iV, if i enjoys the right to autonomy in his private life, then there exist distinct x,y € X such that, whenever x and y are both feasible, i has the power or ability to prevent y from being the social outcome, and also the power or ability to prevent x from being the social outcome.
... (4.2) For all i £ iV ,if [two distinct social alternatives, a and 6, are both feasible, i has the ability to prevent 6 from being the social outcome, and i strictly prefers a to 6], then i will act in such a way that b will not be the outcome.
... (4.3) The terms 'ability' and 'power' figuring in (4.2) and (4.3) are as yet un defined. They need to be given precise content and I shall presently take up this issue. However, the intuitive statements (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) are helpful in understanding the significance of GV in so far as GL! can be viewed as a consequence of (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3). One can then claim that the 'real' significance of Proposition 4.1 lies in the fact that it demonstrates the incom patibility of:
(i) the weak welfaristic judgement GPC", (ii) the libertarian position (4.1); (iii) (4.2) which reflects a specific intuition about what having rights to liberty in one's private life means; and (iv) the behavioural assumption (4.3). (4.2) and (4.3) involve the notion of Vs ability or power, in a game form Ga , to prevent an alternative b from being the outcome. This intuitive notion can be given various precise interpretations. Consider two such interpretations given by (4.4) and (4.5) below, where it is assumed that Ga is the relevant game form and a, 6 £ A. ... (4.3') Replacing '(4.4)' by '(4.5)' in (4.2') and (4.3'), we get versions of (4.2) and (4.3), which correspond to the notion of power given in (4.5) and which I shall call (4.2") and (4.3"), respectively. Both (4.2') and (4.2") seem to be plausible consequences of our intuition about the right to liberty in one's private life such as the right to choose one's own mode of worship, the right to eat vegetarian or non-vegetarian food and so on. What about the behavioural assumptions represented by (4.3') and (4.3")? (4.3') is an implausible behavioral assumption. Let N = {1,2}, A = {x^y.z^w}, and let the game form Ga be given as follow: It is easy to check that 1 has the ability, in the sense of (4.3'), to prevent w from being the outcome, and also the ability to prevent x from being the outcome. However, if (i?i,i?2) is such that zP\xPiwPiy and yP2xP2wP2Z, then the game (Ga',Ri,R2) will be the familiar game of prisoners' dilemma, and w will be the outcome of the game, assuming that the individuals will choose their respecitve dominant strategies (s[A for 1 and s'2A for 2). Since xP\w, this is clearly inconsistent with (4.3'). .. , i?n) G 9in, no Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies8) exists for the game {Ga\ Äi , • • •, Rn) and no two distinct n-tuples of strategies in this game yield identical outcomes.
GV can be regarded as a consequence of either (i) (4.1), (4.2') and (4.3'), or (ii) (4.1), (4.2") and (4.3"). The justification of GV as a consequence of (4.1), (4.2') and (4.3') is not of much intuitive interest in view of the implausibility of (4.3'). I shall, therefore, ignore it, and focus on the justification of GL' as a consequence of (4.1), (4.2") and (4.3") and the corresponding interpretation of Proposition (4.1) as showing the logical incompaticility of G PC', (4.1), (4.2") and (4.3").9 In assessing the intuitive significance of this incompatibility, several points may be noted. First, the incompatiblity, by itself, does not show an inconsistency between the welfaristic principle of GPC1 and the libertarian position reflected in (4.1) and (4.2"). The tension arises from the presence of the behavioural assumption, (4.3"), in addition to GPC', (4.1) and (4.2"). In fact, following a line of reasoning owing to Sugden (1985b) , it can be argued that it is not possible to prove a direct contradiction between GPC1 and the libertarian position represented by (4.1) and (4.2"). This is because, while GPC1 constitutes a restriction on the actual outcome of a game, depending on the individuals' preferences, (4.1) and (4.2) do not refer to either individual preferences or the actual outcome of any game.
Secondly, a difficulty in assessing the intuitive significance of the inconsis tency of GPC', (4.1), (4.2") and (4.3") arises when, given the rights struc ture G, it is impossible to satisfy (4.3"). Suppose the rights structure G is such that, for some A G Z, and for some ( P i,... , Rn) G JRn, the game (Ga, P i , •.
•, Rn) does not have any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and no two distinct n-tuples of strategies in this game yield identical outcomes. Then (4.3") cannot be satisfied, which will formally imply the failure to sat isfy GPC, (4.1), (4.2") and (4.3"), together. But this, in itself, does not reflect any conflict between different ethical values.10 It only shows that, given the rights structure, the empirical assumption (4.3") about how people act in games cannot be valid. Nor does the rights-structure G have to be very unintuitive for this possibility to arise. That, even with a very plausible rights-structure G, there may not be any J satisfying either (4. 1995). Let = {1 ,2}, and let the sole right under consideration be the right to choose one's own shirt. Let X = {ww,rr,wr,rw}, where wr denotes the social state in which 1 wears a white shirt and 2 wears a red shirt, ww denote the social state in which both individuals wear white shirts and so on (all as pects of the social states, other than the two individuals' shirts, are assumed to be fixed). Suppose Gx is as in Figure 2 . (In Figure 2 , w indicates the choice of a white shirt by the person under consideration and r denotes the choice of a red shirt; ww, wb etc. are the different social states as explained above.) Intuitively, given the game form G x , for each individual, it is feasible and per missible to choose either a white shirt or a red shirt, and each person gets to wear the shirt that he chooses to wear. Clearly, Gx corresponds to our intu ition about the right to choose one's own shirt. Assume that (i?i,i?2) is such that wwR\rrRiwrR\rw and wrR2rwR2rrR2WW. The game {Ga,Ru R2) does not have a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies), and, therefore, it is clear that there does not exist J that can possibly satisfy (4.3") or (4.3"') (recall that the function J determines the actually chosen strategies for the different games). Proposition 4-2: There do not exist rights-structure G and function J such that BU , PPC" and REP are all satisfied. Since GU follows from BU and REJ', and GPCf follows from BPC1 and RE P, Proposition 4.2 implies Proposition 4.1. We can view BU as a consequence of (4.1), and the intuitive assumptions (4.6) and (4.7) below:
Re-interpretation of Proposition
For all i G N, if i enjoys the right to autonomy in his private life, then there exist distinct x,y G X such that when x and y are the only feasible alternatives, i has the power to rule out y as the social outcome and also the power to rule out x as the social outcome. ... (4.6) For alH G N and all distinct a, b G X, if [a and b are the only two feasible alternatives, i has the ability to rule out b as the social outcome, and a Pi6], then b will not be the outcome.
... (4.7) As in the case of (4.2) and (4.3), we need to interpret the notion of power figuring in (4.6) and (4.7). Given a feasible set A containing exactly two dis tinct alternatives, a and 6, we can interpret Vs power to rule out b as either (4.4) or (4.5) (note that when \A\ = 2, (4.4) and (4.5) are equivalent). How ever, when there are exactly two feasible alternatives, x and y, which differ only with respect to i 's private life, it seems very plausible to interpret the notion of power in (4.6) in a much stronger sense, namely, as the simultane ous existence of: (i) a permissible strategy of i that will ensure outcome x irrespective of what permissible strategies others adopt; and (ii) a permissible strategy of i that will ensure outcome y irrespective of the permissible strate gies chosen by others. Accordingly, I consider the following precise versions of (4.6) and (4.7), respectively.
For all i G N, if i enjoys the right to autonomy in his private life, then there exist distinct x,y £ X for which the following holds: for all distinct a, b G {x,y}, there exists £ ^i{x,y} such that for all S-i{x,y} ^ n Sj{x,y}) 9{x,y} (S-i{Xiy}) Since BV can be regarded as a consequence of (4.1), (4.8) and (4.9), Propo sition 4.2 (and hence, also Proposition 4.1, which follows from Proposition 4.2) can be interpreted as demonstrating the impossibility of simultaneously satis fying (4.1), (4.8), (4.9), BPC1 and REJ'. Proposition 4.2, therefore, does not show a direct inconsistency between the libertarian position and welfarism: the tension demonstrated by Proposition 4.2 arises from the presence of the behavioural assumption (4.9) and the requirement of REJ' in addition to (4.1), (4.8) and BPC.
(4.8) seems to conform to our intuition about the right to autonomy in one's private life and, therefore, (4.1) and (4.8), together, reflect a very plau sible libertarian position in the game form approach. The plausibility of (4.9) is obvious, and BPC is a very weak welfaristic restriction. This leaves us with REJ1. There are two alternative ways, one descrptive and the other normative, in which REJ' can be interpreted. Under the descriptive inter pretation, REJ1 is an assumption about how people behave. That is, REJ' is interpreted as saying that people choose their strategies in such a way that, for all (i?i,. .. , Rn) £ and all A, B £ Z, if B C A, then for all x £ B, if x is not the outcome of the game (G#; i? i,. .. , i?n), then x will not also be the outcome of the game (Ga' ,Ri, • • • , i?n)-Interpreted in this fashion, REJ' is implausible: there does not seem to be any intuitive reason why people will behave in a way that will necessarily lead to the fulfillment of REJ1. A very convincing example due to Sugden (1985b) shows that REJ1, regarded as an empirical assumption, can be violated even when the individuals behave in a way one would normally expect them to behave, and even when the game forms that represent the rights-structure G conform to our intution about some very familiar rights.
Alternatively, REJ' can also be interpreted as a normative requirement of social consistency. The condition that a feasible alternative that is socially rejected initially should not get socially chosen, when the feasible set of al ternatives is expanded (individual preferences remaining the same), has an inherent attraction. It is possible to argue that this property should be sat isfied by the social choices even if the procedure for arriving at social choices from different possible feasible sets is to let people freely choose their strate gies in the respective game forms specified for these different sets. However, if one adopts such a normative interpretation of REJ', then it is worth noting that, even in the absence of any Paretian conditions and even when individuals act in a 'normal' fashion, REJ' can clash with our intuition about individual rights to liberty in private affairs. This is shown by the example of Sugden (1985b) referred to earlier (the example is as apposite for the normative inter pretation of REJ1 as for its interpretation as an empirical assumption). The point can also be illustrated by extending the example involving the choice of shirts, that I used at the end of Section 4.3. Continue to assume that Gx is as already specified in that example. Further assume G{WWirwy, G{wrirry, G{ww,wr} and G{rw,rr} to be as in Figure 3 below.
Like the earlier specification of the game form Gx in Figure 2 , these addi tional specifications in Figure 3 are in conformity with our intuition about the right to choose one's own shirt. I continue to assume that wwR\rrRiwrR\rw and wrR2rwR2rrR2Ww. If (4.9) holds, then the outcomes of the games 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have sought to interpret Sen's liberal paradox in a framework where the structure of rights is given by the specification of a game form for each possible feasible set of alternatives. The main conclusions of my discussion may be summarized as follows:
(1) In the game form framework, the paradox can be interpreted in at least two plausible ways. First, we can think of the paradox as showing the incompatibility of the welfaristic requirement GPC;, the libertarian position represented by (4.1) and (4.2"), and the behavioural assumption (4.3") (for convenience, call this Interpretation I). Alternatively, one can view the para dox as showing the incompatibility of the welfaristic requirement of B P C , the libertarian position represented by (4.1) and (4.8), the behavioural assump tion (4.9), and REJ1 viewed as a normative requirement of social consistency (call this Interpretation II).
(2) Under neither of these two interpretations, the paradox can be re garded as a direct tension between Paretianism and libertarian values. This is because, in both the interpretations, specific behavioural assumptions are used to generate the tension under consideration. In addition, Interpretation II needs the requirement of social consistency, REJ'.
(3) The use of (4.3") in Interpretation I is rather problematic, since the in terpretation cannot distinguish between: (i) those cases where, given a rightsstructure satisfying (4.1) and (4.2"), the behavioural assumption (4.3") can not possibly be satisfied (assuming that, for every game, there must be some outcome); and (ii) those cases where, given a rights structure satisfying (4.1) and (4.2"), it is possible for the behavioural assumption (4.3") to be satisfied, but GPC is not satisfied if (4.3") holds.
(4) While REJ1, which figures in Interpretation II, has some normative appeal, even in the absence of any Paretian conditions, REJ1 may clash with our intuition about individual rights to liberty in private affairs, if (4.9) holds.
In interpreting the liberal paradox in the framework of the game form approach to individual rights, I have tried to be as faithful as possible to the formal structure of Sen's theorem. However, if one does not adhere rigidly to this formal structure, then it is possible to state and prove more plausible versions of the liberal paradox in the game form framework, which, though departing from Sen's formal structure, are faithful to the intuition of his result. For such analysis, the reader may refer to Campbell (1994) and Deb, Pattanaik and Razzolini (1995) .
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